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EVERYTHING’S BIGGER IN TEXAS: 
                             EXCEPT THE MEDMAL SETTLEMENTS 
 
TOM BAKER, ERIC HELLAND, AND JONATHAN KLICK1 
 
*** 
 
Recent work using Texas closed claim data finds that physicians are rarely 
required to use personal assets in medical malpractice settlements even 
when plaintiffs secure judgments above the physician's insurance limits. In 
equilibrium, this should lead physicians to purchase less insurance. 
Qualitative research on the behavior of plaintiffs suggests that there is a 
norm under which plaintiffs agree not to pursue personal assets as long as 
defendants are not grossly underinsured. This norm operates as a soft 
constraint on physicians. All other things equal, while physicians want to 
lower their coverage, they do not want to violate the norm and trigger an 
attack on their personal assets. This constraint should be less effective 
when physicians have other ways to shield their assets, such as through 
large personal bankruptcy exemptions like those available in Texas. 
Settlement data from the National Practitioner Data Bank indicate that 
settlements in Texas are abnormally low, just as they are in other 
jurisdictions with unlimited homestead exemptions in bankruptcy. 
Consistent with theory, we find that more generous exemptions are also 
associated with lower insurance prices and lower levels of insurance 
coverage. These results suggest that the large "haircuts" and low 
insurance limits observed in the Texas data may be driven by Texas's 
generous bankruptcy provisions. At a minimum, Texas is not generally 
representative of other jurisdictions. This weakens the case for 
extrapolating conclusions from Texas data to other jurisdictions. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Academic theory, conventional wisdom, and empirical reality are 
orthogonal to one another when it comes to medical malpractice. In first 
year law classes, we teach that tort law induces doctors to conform to the 
prevailing standard of care.2  Political rhetoric focuses on medical 
                                                                                                                                      
1 The authors wish to thank Daniel Baltuch and Ben Pyle for research 
assistance and Bernie Black for comments on an earlier draft. 
2  See, e.g., Richard Epstein, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 253-
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malpractice criseses, doctor shortages, and the costs of defensive 
medicine.3  The data suggest that while medical malpractice law does little 
to properly incentivize doctors4 and is an expensive way to compensate 
victims5 on the whole, it adds relatively little to the aggregate cost of 
healthcare.6 
A series of papers using fairly comprehensive7 data from the Texas 
Department of Insurance (TDI)8 on closed medical malpractice claims in 
the state9  adds another degree of separation between theory, public 
                                                                                                                                      
242 (9th ed. 2008).  
3 For a discussion of this rhetoric, see Tom Baker, The Medical Malpractice 
Myth (2005). 
4 For a recent review of the evidence, see Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the 
Medical Malpractice System and Options for Reform, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 95 -
100 (2011). 
5  See David M. Studdert, et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments 
in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006) 
(reporting that in a random sample of 1,452 closed medical malpractice claims, 
payments to lawyers accounted for almost half of the expenditures); This number 
is in line with that reported by Patricia Danzon which compares it with an 
overhead figure for first party insurance closer to 10 percent. Patricia Danzon, 
Liability for Medical Malpractice, 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECON. 1339, 1369 
(2000). 
6 Even studies with the largest estimates place medical malpractice costs at 
less than 3 percent of total healthcare spending in the U.S. See e.g., Michelle M. 
Mello, et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
1569, 1569 (2010) (placing the share at 2.4 percent). See also, Darius Lakdawalla 
& Seth Seabury, The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 15383 (2009) (using sophisticated 
techniques to account for the endogeneity between health care spending and 
medical malpractice and still finds that tort awards account for less than 5 percent 
of the growth in medical spending since 2000). 
7 The primary limitation in the TDI data is that there is limited or no 
information on small claims. Claims involving payments up to $10,000 (in 
nominal terms) are not individually reported, and claims involving payments 
between $10,001 and $24,999 do not require detailed information in the associated 
filing. For example, filings in the latter category contain no information on the 
underlying injury. For all observations, one significant problem with the TDI 
dataset is that it contains no information on physician specialty. 
8 For annual descriptive reports of these data, see Texas Liability Insurance 
Closed Claim Annual Reports, TEX. DEP’T OF INS., 
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/report4.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). 
9 For details on this dataset, see Bernard Black, et al., Stability Not Crisis: 
Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988- 2002, 2 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 
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perception, and reality in this context. Given the ubiquity of non-risk-rated 
medical malpractice insurance,10 for liability to generate incentives for 
physician care, there must be a non-trivial possibility that liability can 
exceed insurance limits.11 Physicians themselves appear to fear exposing 
their personal assets to medical malpractice liability.12 Yet, if the Texas 
data are representative, physicians rarely pay anything above their 
insurance  limits in settlements, even if a case generates a judgment that 
exceeds those limits.13 That is, plaintiff awards above insurance limits 
generally receive a “haircut” bringing them down to a level where a 
defendant doctor does not have to use any personal assets to satisfy the 
judgment.14 
The Texas data present a puzzle. If the risk of an above limit 
payment is really so small, why do physicians worry about liability at all?  
What’s more, given that Texas has no regulation requiring a minimum 
level of medical malpractice insurance,15 why do physicians buy as much 
insurance as they do? In equilibrium, the fact that plaintiffs do not pursue 
personal assets to satisfy above limit judgments should lead physicians to 
                                                                                                                                      
207 (2005). 
10  For a discussion of this peculiarity, see Frank A. Sloan, Experience Rating: 
Does It Make Sense for Medical Malpractice Insurance?, 80 Aᴍ. Eᴄᴏɴ. Rᴇᴠ. 128 
(1990). 
11 Physicians may be incentivized by reputational concerns that are affected by 
the litigation system even if they do not bear the direct costs of settlements and 
judgments. For some evidence of these reputational concerns, see Eric Helland & 
Gia Lee, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Website: Disclosure’s Impact on 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 12 Aᴍ Lᴀᴡ Eᴄᴏɴ Rᴇᴠ 423 (2010). 
12 Internet searches yield numerous business entities advertising asset 
protection services aimed at physicians, invoking fears regarding medical 
malpractice claims. For example, see Capital Asset, Inc.,  
http://www.bulletproofasset.com/physicians.htm (accessed October 11, 2013). 
Another telling indicator of the demand for asset protection services among 
physicians is the existence of the book, now in its second edition, Robert J. Mintz, 
ASSET PROTECTION FOR PHYSICIANS AND BUSINESS OWNERS (2nd ed. 2010). 
13  David A. Hyman, Bernard S. Black, & Charles Silver, Settlement at Policy 
Limit and the Duty to Settle: Evidence from Texas, 8 J. Eᴍᴘɪʀɪᴄᴀʟ Lᴇɢ. Sᴛᴜᴅ. 48 
(2011). 
14 David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, & William 
M. Sage, Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas 
Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003  4 J. Eᴍᴘɪʀɪᴄᴀʟ Lᴇɢ. Sᴛᴜᴅ. 3, 7 (2007). 
15 While some states do have such regulations, Texas is not among them.  See 
American Medical Association, STATE LAWS MANDATING MINIMUM LEVEL OF 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE  (2012). 
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reduce their insurance coverage. 
The Texas results, and the questions they raise, relate closely to 
earlier work done by Tom Baker on the topic of “blood money.16” In that 
work, attorneys  suggested  that  plaintiffs  are  reluctant  to  pursue  a  
defendant’s personal assets (blood money) both because it is relatively 
difficult to get at personal assets and because of the view that it is unfair, 
except in certain circumstances, to go after those assets. One implication of 
these findings is that, all other things equal, the easier it is for a defendant 
to shield her assets, the less likely it is that a plaintiff will pursue blood 
money. Subsequent work on the blood money phenomenon claims that 
generous bankruptcy exemptions are among the most important 
impediments keeping plaintiffs from pursuing larger settlements.17 
In this article, we pick up some of the open questions raised by the 
work on haircuts in the Texas medical malpractice data in light of the 
qualitative work on blood money. After reviewing both sets of literature in 
section 2, we provide a simple model of the equilibrium behavior of a 
physician in choosing her insurance level in light of these literatures in 
section 3. In section 4, we briefly describe the homestead exemptions that 
exist in each state. In section 5, we outline the empirical evidence that 
supports our model. In section 6, we show that settlements are 
systematically lower in states with more generous homestead exemptions 
using comprehensive data on medical malpractice payments from the 
National Practitioner Data Bank. To link this result to our model, we 
provide evidence from a nationally representative survey showing that 
medical malpractice insurance prices are systematically lower in states 
with more generous exemptions, consistent with a model where the 
demand for insurance declines when bankruptcy law provides an alternate 
vehicle for protecting assets. Lastly, we analyze insurance policies from a 
database of an insolvent insurer showing that doctors choose lower policy 
limits in states with more generous bankruptcy protections, further 
bolstering our basic claims. Section 7 discusses the robustness and 
limitations of our results, and section 8 concludes. 
In addition to verifying the importance of bankruptcy protections 
to tort law in action, our results suggest that at least some of the findings of 
the papers using the Texas closed claim data may be specific to regimes 
with large bankruptcy exemptions like Texas. Given that, it may not be 
                                                                                                                                      
16 Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort 
Law in Action, 35 Lᴀᴡ & Sᴏᴄ’ʏ Rᴇᴠ. 275 (2001). 
17 Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 Wᴀsʜ. & Lᴇᴇ L. Rᴇᴠ. 
603 (2006). 
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reasonable to expect that haircuts will be as common or as large in states 
where asset protection is more difficult given the propensity of doctors to 
buy more medical malpractice insurance coverage in such states.  Even if 
doubts remain about causality in the relationship we study, it seems clear 
that something makes Texas peculiar,18 limiting the value of using the TDI 
data to draw conclusions about the state of medical malpractice liability 
more generally. Concerns about unobserved heterogeneity of this type 
should lead researchers to focus on datasets that allow for better research 
designs that exploit natural experiments and more cross- jurisdiction 
comparisons.19 
 
II. BLOOD MONEY AND BANKRUPTCY 
 
The research on blood money grew out of a qualitative study of 
personal injury lawyers in Florida and Connecticut conducted in  the mid-
1990s. First focused on the relationship between tort claims and liability 
insurance,20 the study went on to explore the circumstances in which 
plaintiffs seek more than just insurance money from individual defendants. 
That question touched such an emotional chord among the lawyers that it 
became a central focus of the interviews, with plaintiffs’ and defense 
lawyers alike distancing themselves from “what we call blood money, 
instead of insurance company money.”21 The defense lawyers emphasized 
the extent to which they protected their clients from having to pay blood 
money. The plaintiffs’ lawyers emphasized the extent to which they 
acculturated their clients to the strong norm that plaintiffs are supposed “to 
take it [money] from an insurance company as opposed to an individual.”22 
In explaining this norm, the lawyers identified moral and practical 
considerations. Except in three kinds of circumstances to be explained 
shortly, going after “blood money” is ethically and morally problematic for 
                                                                                                                                      
18 Texas is peculiar for many reasons. See, e.g., Barney Smith’s Toilet Seat Art 
Museum, Roadside America, http://www.roadsideamerica.com/story/6166. We 
focus solely on those related to medical malpractice in this article. 
19 See generally, Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, The Credibility 
Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design is Taking the 
Con out of Econometrics, 24 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 2, 2010 at 3. 
20 Tom Baker, Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the 
Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 214 (1998). 
21 Baker, supra note 16, at 281. 
22 Id. at 283. 
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both plaintiffs and their lawyers.23 In addition, the lawyers reported that 
there are serious practical hurdles: “it is easier to collect from an   
insurance company than it is to go against the individual and try to garnish 
wages, foreclose on a home, as well as other things that most people aren’t 
interested in doing, whereas the insurance companies, they’re like a 
bank.”24 
As the lawyers reported, the legal rule regarding the liability 
insurer’s “duty to settle” reinforces the practice of accepting the available 
insurance money in settlement of the claim.25 This legal rule obligates an 
insurer to “to make reasonable settlement decisions that protect the insured 
from judgments in excess of the policy limits.”26 An insurer that breaches 
this duty must pay the full amount of any resulting judgment, 
notwithstanding the fact that liability insurance policies place limits on the 
amounts that insurers are contractually obligated to pay. This insurance law 
rule and the practical difficulties of collecting significant amounts of 
money from individuals combine to create a very strong incentive for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle even very serious liability claims for the 
insurance policy limits, sometimes with the hope that the insurance 
company will unreasonably refuse to accept the offer, thereby “setting up” 
the insurance company to pay much more money after trial.27  
With or without this hope, the lawyers report that the moral and 
practical considerations against blood money create such a strong social 
practice of accepting the available insurance money as payment in full that 
it takes a great deal of effort for a plaintiff to persuade a defense lawyer 
that she or he is actually serious about demanding the payment of blood 
money in an ordinary negligence case.28 For most plaintiffs in most cases 
against ordinary middle class defendants, the choice is clear, as explained 
                                                                                                                                      
23 Id. at 284-85. Interesting, the few plaintiffs’ lawyers who actively resisted 
the no blood money norm (while acknowledging that it existed) pointed out that 
lawyers who refuse to go after blood money may well be violating their ethical 
obligation to serve as zealous advocates for their clients.  Id. at 287. 
24 Id. at 285.  See also Id. at 289 (an explanation of how going after 
blood money can be harder and take longer than just collecting from 
insurance company). 
25 Id. at 291-92. 
26 Principles of Liability Insurance Project (AM. LAW INST., Draft No. 3, 
2012). 
27 Baker, supra note 16, at 293-94.  See also David A. Hyman, Bernard S. 
Black & Charles Silver, Settlement at Policy Limit and the Duty to Settle: Evidence 
from Texas, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 48 (2011). 
28 Baker, supra note 16, at 291. 
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in the following statement from a plaintiffs’ lawyer who reported that  he 
had never collected blood money: 
 
This woman is coming in tomorrow; she has to make the 
decision. Does she want to pursue this guy on a personal 
basis? It’s not going to make any difference, because … 
the guy who caused all this happened to be a teacher, an 
elementary musical [sic] teacher. Makes about $45,000 a 
year; he’s got three kids. He’s got no equity in his house, 
and he’s got an old car. If she pursues him, what’s going to 
happen is, she’ll get  a  judgment.   It’s going to be for a lot  
more than $100,000, and he’s going to go into bankruptcy. 
And when he goes into bankruptcy, he’s going to keep his 
house, he’s going to keep his car, and he’s going to keep 
under the statute, $15,000. You can’t tap into his IRA, if he 
has one, his 401K if he’s got one for school, for his group, 
his employment. So what advantage is there for the client 
to do that? Plus, she can get $100,000 now, or she can wait 
four years and get $100,000. So, for that reason I’ve never 
been in a situation where I’ve taken personal liability.29 
 
The lawyers reported three circumstances in which pursuing blood 
money is not a breach of the norm: when the defendant clearly  deserves 
punishment,30 when the plaintiff died or suffered various serious injuries 
and the defendant’s conduct was more than merely negligent,31 and when 
                                                                                                                                      
29 Id. at 289. 
30  Id. at 298 (“Parents and relatives of people who are killed by drunk[en] 
drivers want blood. They really want blood. I forgot what question of yours initiated 
this, but in those cases, the clients themselves have an interest in gouging, to make 
the point to the person and to have the word get out, usually to other youths that 
‘Holy shit! Jones’s father lost his house.’”). 
31 Id. at 299 (“Generally, ... tragic injuries. I’m thinking of one where a young 
kid was rendered a quadriplegic in a swimming pool accident, and the people were 
actually supervising a party, like a high school graduation party or such, and they 
were actually there and they were allowing drinking; kids got crazy as teenagers ..., 
and the poor youngster ended up in a wheelchair. And the homeowners coverage, I 
think, was $300,000, which obviously didn’t even touch the value of the case, and 
we did attach property there because the people ... insisted on it, and we did get the 
payment because it was a fairly nice house and there was a good amount of money 
there; but we generally, and maybe it’s just a personal preference, but we don’t like 
doing it.”). 
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the defendant failed to purchase enough insurance.32 The latter 
circumstance is what we focus on in this quantitative research. It is an 
imprecise, presumably local, norm: 
 
How much is enough? My interviews do not provide a 
clear answer, but they do provide a way to think about it. 
The minimum is whatever it takes to claim, credibly, that 
you have satisfied your moral obligation to insure.    
Ordinary people have an obligation to purchase insurance 
in ordinary amounts. Wealthy people have an obligation to 
purchase insurance in larger amounts.33 
 
In the years since this qualitative research was published, legal 
scholarship has advanced the understanding of the blood money story in 
two main ways. First, Steven Gilles took the main empirical insight of the 
blood money research, combined it with Lynn LoPucki’s “death of 
liability” idea,34 and advanced the thesis that, at least for ordinary middle 
class individuals, ours is a “Judgment-Proof Society.”35 A host of legal 
rules that protect middle class incomes and assets from execution combine 
to make liability insurance the only significant asset available to tort 
plaintiffs. Gilles’ exhaustive march through these legal rules provided 
firmer ground for the earlier, admittedly impressionistic observation by 
Baker that “for claims against all but the wealthiest individuals and 
organizations, liability insurance is a de facto element of tort liability.”36 
Second, the team working with the Texas medical malpractice 
                                                                                                                                      
32 Id. at 297 (“If a lawyer or doctor chooses to go bare, which is an economic 
decision to put more money in their own pockets and not pay their premiums, then 
I probably would go after them because that’s wrong, because they are now not 
protecting– it’s now not just being negligent, they’re making a conscious decision 
that if they screw up, they’re not going to protect their client or their patient. And 
they did that so that they could make more money.”). 
33  Id. at 296-97. 
34 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE. L. J.  1 (1996). 
35 Gilles, supra note 17, at 607 (“This Article is about how our laws have 
made being judgment-proof the rule rather than the exception; about what this 
implies for the standard deterrence, corrective justice, and loss-spreading accounts 
of tort law; and about whether anything should be done to lower the legal barriers 
to enforcing and collecting tort judgments from individual tortfeasors”). 
36 Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability 
Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, Tort Law and Liability Insurance at 295 
(Gerhard Wagner ed. 2005). 
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closed claim data has used those data to test the blood money hypothesis 
quantitatively. They analyzed whether doctors ever paid blood money in 
medical malpractice claims in Texas. Their answer – almost never, not 
even in cases with big jury verdicts – supported the qualitative research, 
with three interesting extensions.37 
First, because doctors have incomes that are well above middle 
class, the explanation for this result cannot rest entirely on the practical 
bankruptcy protection explanations provided by the Connecticut lawyers. 
(Gilles would point to trust law.38 The Connecticut lawyers would claim 
that morality also plays a role.)  Second, the Texas data also include 
payments made in cases that went to trial, allowing the researchers to 
report that doctors rarely  paid blood money even after losing a big case at 
trial.39  Heretofore the blood money story had focused exclusively on pre-
trial settlements. The finding that doctors did not have to pay blood money 
even when the jury verdict greatly exceeded the medical malpractice 
insurance policy limit significantly strengthened the thesis of the original 
qualitative research. If doctors regularly make post-verdict settlements that 
give the plaintiffs only the insurance money, plaintiffs have little hope of 
collecting blood money from a pre-trial settlement. 
This dynamic explains the third, initially surprising extension of 
the Texas researchers: Texas doctors buy insurance policies with much 
lower limits than scholars had previously believed, and the amount of 
insurance that the doctors bought declined in real terms over the years the 
researchers studied. Taking the blood money story seriously, however, this 
result is not surprising. Why should physicians buy more insurance than 
they need? Once doctors buy enough insurance to satisfy the “no blood 
money” norm and the liability insurance requirements of their contracting 
partners (most significantly, hospitals), any additional insurance provides a 
benefit only to patients who sue them. Within the dominant world view of 
the medical profession, patients who sue are the enemy, not a group 
deserving of extra protection from physicians’ voluntary purchase of 
                                                                                                                                      
37 See Hyman, supra note 13, at 48. 
38 Gilles, supra note 17, at 635-42.  
39 Hyman et al., supra note 13, at 51.  See also, Hyman et al., supra note 14 at 
7 (“Post-verdict settlements were often at or below policy limits even when the 
adjusted verdict exceeded these limits. In the 214 “single-payer” cases for which 
we have data on policy limits, we estimate that policy limits explain at least 73 
percent of the aggregate haircut ($71 million/$97 million). In single-payer cases 
with adjusted verdicts that exceeded the policy limits, 92 percent (71/77) received 
a haircut”). 
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insurance in amounts that exceed the norm.40 
We investigate these dynamics below, developing a model of 
insurance choice for a doctor rationally reacting to an environment where 
plaintiffs do not pursue blood money except in cases of egregious 
underinsuring. 
 
III. SIMPLE MODEL 
 
In choosing a medical malpractice insurance policy, price and the 
amount of coverage41 will generally drive a physician’s choice.42 These 
two factors are not independent since an individual can always purchase a 
policy with higher limits if she is willing to pay a higher price. This 
decision process might be constrained, however. Some states regulate 
minimum coverage levels43, and even more often, hospitals will set their 
own higher requirements as a pre-condition for being able to practice at the 
hospital.44 For simplicity, we ignore these constraints in the theoretical 
model that follows45, but we include the effect of state regulations in the 
empirical work presented below. 
We do, however, consider another influence in a physician’s policy 
choice. In documenting the blood money phenomenon, Baker found 
qualitative evidence that plaintiffs were more likely to go after personal 
assets if the defendant consciously chose to underinsure.46 The interview 
subjects in that study suggested that the definition of adequate insurance is 
not precise, but is instead driven by potentially evolving norms that are 
determined contextually. Respondents also suggested that, all other things 
                                                                                                                                      
40 Timothy Marjoribanks, Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good, Ann G. Lawthers & 
Lynn M. Peterson, Physicians’ Discourses on Malpractice and the Meaning of 
Medical Malpractice, 37 J. HEALTH AND SOC. BEHAVIOR 163 (1996).  
41 We do not distinguish between per-occurrence limits and aggregate annual 
limits. The intuition captured in the model below follows for both kinds of limits. 
42 We ignore other terms of second order importance, such as consent to settle 
clauses and deductibles since they do not affect our analysis. 
43 See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/medical-liability-malpractice-2010- 
legislation.aspx (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (providing an overview of state 
regulations regarding medical malpractice limits).  
44 See Michelle M. Mello, Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance: A 
Primer, 8 ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. RES. SYNTHESIS REP. 1, 3 (2006).  
45 Including constraints of this type in the simple model presented below 
would not qualitatively change the conclusions. 
46 Baker, Blood Money, supra note 16, at 296-98.  
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equal, wealthier individuals were expected to maintain more insurance 
coverage than individuals with more limited means. This suggests that 
doctors will likely consider these norms when choosing their policy limits, 
although, given the inherent fuzziness of these norms, they will tend to 
operate as soft influences rather than hard constraints. 
To formalize the doctor’s decision process, we assume that the 
individual chooses only the policy limit, which in turn affects the price 
paid for the policy.  All other terms of the policy are fixed.  Further, we 
assume  there are no legal or professional regulations that set policy limits. 
Lastly, we assume that the terms of the physician’s policy do not affect the 
level of harm suffered by a plaintiff47, but we do allow the chosen limits to 
affect the cost borne by the physician after an adverse event for which the 
physician may be held liable. We allow for this both directly, with the 
physician automatically being indemnified for any cost below the limit, 
and indirectly with the probability that a plaintiff will seek blood money 
for losses above the limit being an inverse function of the policy limit 
itself. That is, all other things equal, the likelihood a plaintiff seeks blood 
money will be lower as the insurance limit is higher. This indirect effect 
captures the norm described above. 
For our model, the physician chooses L to minimize the sum of the 
cost of her policy C(L) which is a function of the policy limit and the 
expected out of pocket costs she expects to pay to plaintiffs. The expected 
payment out of personal assets is a random variable, and so its expectation 
is expressed as the integral of the potential harm H(x) multiplied by the 
associated probability distribution f(x,L). As suggested above, while we do 
not allow the harm suffered by the plaintiff to vary as a function of the 
policy limit, we do allow the likelihood that the physician must bear those 
losses via a settlement to be a function of the policy limit. Specifically, we 
assume that as L increases, f(x,L) declines. 
The physician then solves the following: 
 
 
The range of the integral goes from the policy limit (L), since the policy 
covers any amount up to the limit, to infinity.48 To solve this problem, the 
                                                                                                                                      
47 We disallow, for example, the potential for moral hazard. 
48 More realistically, the upper bound is some measure of total available 
assets, perhaps including future income streams. The results that follow do not 
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individual takes the first derivative of the expression with respect to L and 
sets it equal to zero.49  This leads to the following first order condition50: 
 
Rearranged: 
 
This provides the standard result that the individual increases her insurance 
limit up to the point where the marginal cost (i.e., how much it costs to 
increase the limit by one dollar) is exactly equal to the marginal benefit. In 
this case, the marginal benefit is equal to the likelihood of facing an 
incremental harm just equal to the chosen policy limit and the doctor being 
able to satisfy his obligation for that additional harm through his insurance 
policy as opposed to being required to pay out of pocket, minus  the 
expected savings garnered from not having to pay for above limit harms 
(because the increase in the limit lowered the likelihood of violating the 
underinsurance norm). 
We note an interesting implication of this model. If we were to 
take from the haircuts literature that individual doctors are very unlikely to 
ever pay out of pocket to settle a claim, this would imply that at least  the 
first element of the marginal benefit is zero. That is, if plaintiffs virtually 
never seek to collect damages exceeding the insurance limits, there is no 
benefit to extending the limits to cover an incremental harm. This suggests 
that a doctor’s decision regarding coverage limits, ignoring regulatory 
requirements, will depend on the degree to which plaintiffs are willing to 
seek blood money due to the doctor’s decision to underinsure. 
What constitutes an adequate level of insurance is unclear. 
Interviews with lawyers suggest that it depends on the defendant’s wealth 
and a reasonable expectation of likely damages. Doctors, especially those 
engaging in risky practices, appear to be held to a high standard in this 
regard.51 
There appears, however, to be a tension between these qualitative 
                                                                                                                                      
qualitatively depend on which upper bound is used. 
49 We assume that the relevant second order conditions are satisfied. 
50 See Akira Takayama, Analytical Methods in Economics, at 200 (1993) for 
an illustration of differentiation of a definite integral. 
51 Baker, Blood Money, supra note 16, at 296-298. 
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impressions and the findings of the haircuts literature. Specifically, in the 
Texas Department of Insurance database, doctors effectively never pay out 
of pocket to satisfy judgments or settlement amounts. In the period 1990–
2003, in the 9,525 cases with a paid medical malpractice claim, Zeiler et al. 
find that 98.5 percent of claims settle at or below the policy limit.52  Even 
among those few cases where payments to plaintiffs exceed the limit, 
physicians  paid  out  of  pocket  less  than  half  the  time.  In  dollar terms, 
throughout the entire sample, physicians paid less than $12 million total.53  
In expectation, this amounts to about $30 per year for the average 
physician.54 
These numbers could be consistent with the qualitative findings. 
Perhaps Texas doctors were particularly risk averse, leading them to insure 
at exceedingly high levels. Zeiler et al., however, found that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, Texas doctors generally carried policies with limits 
below $1 million in nominal terms and did not increase the amount of 
coverage to keep pace with inflation.55 Perhaps conventional wisdom 
overstates the real exposure faced by doctors, with Texas physicians doing 
a relatively good job calibrating their coverage to actual awards and 
settlements by holding policies with limits under the million dollar mark. 
This, too, is belied by the Texas data. Hyman et al. find that, on average, 
plaintiffs recover amounts well below what juries award. In a given case 
that proceeds to a judgment, the TDI data for the 1988–2003 period show 
haircuts of almost 30 percent. Because cases with larger verdicts are more 
likely to be subjected to a haircut and the haircuts themselves are generally 
larger when awards are bigger, more than 50 percent of money awarded is 
not collected by plaintiffs.56 While some of the haircut arises due to 
statutory limits on damages and judicial reductions, Hyman et al. estimate 
that at least 73 percent of the total award reduction results from policy 
limits.57 It would seem that physicians, at least those covered by the Texas 
data, systematically underinsure if jury verdicts are a reliable guide to what 
                                                                                                                                      
52 Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, David A. Hyman, and 
William M. Sage, Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: 
Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEG. STUD. S9, S10 (2007). 
53 Id. at S25. 
54 Zeiler et al find that in the period 1990-2003, physicians paid a total $11.8 
million above policy limits out of pocket (s25). Table 2 suggests that in that period, 
there were, on average, 27,747 doctors in Texas, leading to an average per doctor 
annual exposure of $30.38. 
55 Id. at S41. 
56 Hyman, supra note 14, at 28. 
57 Id. at 7. 
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is considered adequate insurance, yet this does not appear to regularly 
trigger a plaintiff’s willingness to seek blood money. 
Work by Stephen Gilles offers a potential explanation for the large 
haircuts observed in the Texas data. Gilles suggests that asset protection 
mechanisms, especially generous bankruptcy exemptions, effectively make 
defendants judgment-proof.58 That is, even for individuals like physicians 
who likely have non-trivial personal assets, it is often quite easy to make 
those assets non-collectible.59 After making this insight, Gilles raises the 
question we flag above: namely why does anyone buy liability insurance if 
asset protection is available for a defendant to make herself judgment- 
proof?60 
Gilles’ answer is that, while available asset protection strategies 
can make an individual mostly judgment-proof, complete asset protection 
is not possible, leading Gilles to conclude that individuals buy less liability 
insurance than they would in the absence of asset protection measures, but 
they still buy some insurance above and beyond mandated minimums. 
Gilles suggests that the blood money norm – at least with respect to only 
pursuing a defendant’s personal assets when the defendant is not 
adequately insured – has very little to do with fairness and much more to 
do with the relative difficulty of getting access to such assets.61 
If Gilles is correct, we should observe that individuals 
systematically purchase less insurance when asset protection is easier, 
since they can deduce that strong asset protection measures will lead 
plaintiffs to settle for the amount of an insurance policy limit, even if it is 
inadequate. Homestead exemptions in state bankruptcy laws provide a 
major source of asset protection, according to Gilles.62 These insights may 
provide a partial explanation for the large haircuts and low insurance limits 
observed in the work using the TDI data, given that Texas had an unlimited 
homestead exemption throughout the period analyzed in the relevant set of 
papers. 
 
IV. HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS 
 
Individuals seeking to remove their debt obligations have two 
separate and mutually exclusive personal bankruptcy procedures in the 
                                                                                                                                      
58 Gilles, supra note 17, at 624. 
59 Id. at 606. 
60 Id. at 662-65. 
61 Id. at 666. 
62 Id. at 630. 
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United States: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. The main difference between the 
two is that Chapter 7 requires payment from assets, but once assets are 
exhausted debtors have no claim on the bankrupt’s future income. By 
contrast Chapter 13 bankruptcy requires repayment from future income, 
although debts are still reduced commensurate with the individual’s 
income.63  The key factor for our analysis is that bankruptcy, particularly 
chapter 7 bankruptcy, ends all efforts to collect debt related to personal 
injury torts such as medical malpractice.64 
In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy many states exempt certain assets which 
are protected from creditors. Typically this includes clothing, household 
goods and perhaps a vehicle and, most importantly for our purposes, in 
several states, homestead exemptions that allow a party to keep all or part 
of the equity in a home. Although reforms in 2005 limited the protection 
available for recently acquired homestead equity, these reforms only apply 
to a small part of the data we examine and, nevertheless, in most 
circumstances individuals can still avail themselves of the exemption.65  
We provide details on state homestead exemptions during the period 
covered by our datasets, 1988-2008 in Table 1 below. We categorize states 
as having zero exemption, a partial exemption, and an unlimited 
exemption. 
We focus primarily on states with unlimited homestead exemptions 
because an unlimited exemption is the same everywhere and it is 
                                                                                                                                      
63 Although most of our discussion in this paper focuses on Chapter 7 
bankruptcy prior to the 2005 bankruptcy reform anecdotal evidence suggests that 
doctors seeking to reduce a judgment in excess of insurance, if any, could still 
reduce their expected losses under Chapter 13 since the payments were based on 
ability to pay. In one example a hypothetical 6 million dollar judgment against a 
bare doctor cited by Foodman & Associates in 2005 could result in 5 years of 
payments of $10,000 a year for a physician earning $200,000 a year. 
Moreover there are other methods for using the bankruptcy system to 
reduce or eliminate judgments. One of the more extreme is intentional divorce in 
which the doctor divorces their partner and generously gives up all the family 
assets in the divorce only to remarry at a later date. This may seem extreme and the 
stuff of situation comedy; at least on the last score it is. See for example the 2003 
comedic play, “Going Bare” by Mary Jane Taegel in which an obstetrician who 
has dropped his liability coverage receives a $4.2 million judgment, and conspires 
with his wife to get a divorce to protect their assets.  Hilarity ensues. 
64 Gilles, supra note 17, at 648-50 (discussing the relationship between 
bankruptcy and tort judgments during the time period that matches most closely to 
the data used here and in the set of papers using the TDI data). 
65 Id. at 655 (discussing how most individuals can still take advantage of the 
homestead exemption).  
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qualitatively different from partial exemption or no exemption. An 
unlimited exemption protects all equity in a home from creditors. By 
contrast, states with partial exemptions vary widely in their levels.66 For 
example the $10,000 exemption  in  North  Carolina  provides  much  less  
protection than the $100,000 exemption in Idaho, and even that relatively 
generous $100,000 exemption does not provide a doctor the means to 
shield significant wealth provided by the unlimited exemption granted in 
nine states (see Table 1). Moreover, because of the clarity of the unlimited 
homestead exemption, bankruptcy proceedings in those nine states are 
often very quick, typically taking around 90 days.67 
 
Table 1: State Homestead Exemptions 
State 
Homestead 
Exemption Years in Effect 
AK Partial 1988-2008 
AL Partial 1988-2008 
AR Unlimited 1988-2008 
AZ Partial 1988-2008 
CA Partial 1988-2008 
CO Partial 1988-2008 
CT 0 1988-1994 
CT Partial 1994-2008 
DC 0 1988-2001 
DC Unlimited 2001-2008 
DE 0 1988-2001 
DE Partial 2001-2008 
FL Unlimited 1988-2008 
Federal Partial 1988-2008 
GA Partial 1988-2008 
HI Partial 1988-2008 
                                                                                                                                      
66 See Jeffrey Traczynski, Divorce Rates and Bankruptcy Exemption Levels in 
the United States, 54 J. L. & ECON. 751, 762-63 (2011) (showing tables with 
specific amounts of the exemptions in 1989, 1995, and 2005). 
67 Maureen Glabman, New Bankruptcy Law: Blip or Blow for Florida 
Physicians? FLORIDA MEDICAL BUSINESS, reprinted in SINGERXENOS, 
http://www.singerxenos.com/pages/newsprint/fmbbankruptcy.html (last visited 
Aug 18, 2016). 
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IA Unlimited 1988-2008 
ID Partial 1988-2008 
IL Partial 1988-2008 
IN Partial 1988-2008 
KS Unlimited 1988-2008 
KY Partial 1988-2008 
LA Partial 1988-2008 
MA Partial 1988-2008 
MD 0 1988-2008 
ME Partial 1988-2008 
MI Partial 1988-2008 
MN Unlimited 1988-1993 
MN Partial 1997-2001 
MO Partial 1988-2008 
MS Partial 1988-2008 
MT Partial 1988-2008 
NC Partial 1988-2008 
ND Partial 1988-2008 
NE Partial 1988-2008 
NH Partial 1988-2008 
NJ 0 1988-2008 
NM Partial 1988-2008 
NV Partial 1988-2008 
NY Partial 1988-2008 
OH Partial 1988-2008 
OK Unlimited 1988-2008 
OR Partial 1988-2008 
PA 0 1988-2008 
RI 0 198-2001 
RI Partial 2002-2008 
SC Partial 1988-2008 
SD Unlimited 1988-2008 
TN Partial 1988-2008 
TX Unlimited 1988-2008 
UT Partial 1988-2008 
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VA Partial 1988-2008 
VT Partial 1988-2008 
WA Partial 1988-2008 
WI Partial 1988-2008 
WV Partial 1988-2008 
WY Partial 1988-2008 
Source: Elias, S., Renuauer, A., and Leonard, R. How to File for Bankruptcy, 
various editions Berkeley, Calif.: Nolo Press 1988-2008 
 
Prior to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 Act, there was no income test for Chapter 7, so an 
individual could discharge debts without a claim on future income, 
regardless of how high that income is. In effect, this allowed bankrupt 
individuals to protect almost all of their other assets in states with 
unlimited homestead exemptions, by simply taking non-exempt assets and 
using them to pay down a mortgage or buy a larger house.68  
In fact the threat of bankruptcy is also rumored to play an 
important role in settlement negotiations in states with unlimited 
exemptions. For example, the Florida Medical Business letter reported that, 
in Florida, which has an unlimited exemption: 
 
“Bankruptcy [is] a hammer for bare doctors,: according to 
Marc Singer, a Coral Gables. “We’ve used the threat of 
bankruptcy in about 100 cases to help achieve reasonable 
settlements with plaintiff attorneys.”69 
 
Indeed, the Florida legislature allowed doctors to go without insurance 
                                                                                                                                      
68 There are limits on the timing of such asset reclassification but these are 
typically fairly short and for medical malpractice cases which can take 
considerable time to resolve allow doctors who suspect they are facing a large 
liability judgment plenty of time to reclassify assets before the judgment is 
recorded. See Glabman, supra note 67, (discussing the implications for the 2005 
Act on physicians’ ability to protect assets). Case law in a number of states has 
also found that debts expunged by bankruptcy are still the legal obligation of the 
insurance company so that even if debt was discharged by bankruptcy the 
insurance company still had to pay. See Matter of Edgeworth, 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th 
Cir. 1993) in which a Florida doctor’s judgment was expunged. The Court found 
that the despite the bankruptcy the doctor insurer still had a legal obligation to pay 
the judgment up to the policy limit. 
69 See Glabman, supra note 67. 
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starting in 1987 (allowing them to post a bond instead). 
Following the 2005 Act, debtors can no longer simply choose the 
type of bankruptcy they wish to pursue, because access to chapter 7 is now 
means tested. For this reason, we confine ourselves to cases prior to the 
date in 2005 when the Act’s provisions took effect.70 
How important are homestead exemptions in determining the size 
of the haircuts on the amounts that physicians would otherwise have to 
pay? The large haircuts identified in the TDI dataset are striking, both 
because of their frequency and their size. Given the norm identified in the 
blood money literature, these findings are especially surprising in light of 
the low level of insurance coverage purchased by Texas physicians on 
average.71   
Gillie’s insight about asset protection and homestead exemptions 
in state bankruptcy laws provides a potential explanation. If this 
explanation is correct, it significantly limits the generalizability of the 
Texas findings, because only a few other states have the same generous 
exemptions as Texas.72 
                                                                                                                                      
70 The Act was signed into law by President Bush on April 20, 2005 with the 
provisions applying to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005. See Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23. See also Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 175–99 (2007). 
71 See Baker, supra note 16, at 297-98 quoting a plaintiff’s lawyer as  
follows: “We have a case now where a doctor testified at his deposition that his 
group got together and they consciously made a decision to have million dollar 
policies despite the fact that they are obstetricians and they know that their 
exposure is greater, because they understood that if they only carried a million 
dollars, the case would settle for a million dollars and they would be better off.  
And under those circumstances, where someone has made that kind of a conscious 
decision to be underinsured, I would feel less compunction about going after them, 
and the client probably would also.”  
Note the hypothetical nature of the claim. On close analysis, very few of  
the Connecticut lawyers’ statements are inconsistent with a more straightforward 
rational actor explanation, as Gilles has previously noted.  See Gilles, supra note 
17, at 666 (“whatever their moral beliefs may be, the self-interest of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys appears sufficient to explain the professional norm to which most of 
them subscribe”). 
72 Interestingly, Florida is the only other state with similarly public medical 
malpractice claim payment literature though the data have not been as fully mined 
as the Texas data. See generally Neil Vidmara, Kara MacKillop & Paul Lee, 
Million Dollar Medical Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-Verdict and Pre-Suit 
Settlements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (2006) (finding substantial post-judgement 
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A conclusion that bankruptcy exemptions drive the Texas haircut 
results, however, is premature. Such a conclusion requires a more rigorous 
statistical analysis than is possible with data from a single jurisdiction. To 
examine this hypothesis, we require data from multiple jurisdictions to be 
able to compare insurance limits in states with generous exemptions to the 
insurance limits observed in states with more modest bankruptcy 
protections.  That is the primary contribution of this Article. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
We examine three data sources each of which contains slightly 
different information relevant to our hypothesis. Our theory relies on the 
claim from the quantitative TDI research and the qualitative claims of the 
blood money literature that doctors generally will not be forced to pay out 
of pocket to satisfy settlements and judgments even if the latter exceed the 
doctor’s insurance policy limit unless the doctor is perceived as having 
under-insured. The desire to avoid the risk of paying out of pocket due to a 
violation of the adequate insurance norm is likely to be decreasing in the 
ability of doctors to protect their assets through other mechanisms, such as 
bankruptcy law. If these assumptions are correct, we should find that, all 
other things equal, settlements (pre or post judgment) should be lower in 
states that have more generous bankruptcy exemptions. We test this 
implication using data from the National Practitioner Data Bank, finding 
support. 
Second, given the validation of those assumptions, our model 
predicts that demand for insurance should be lower in jurisdictions with 
more generous bankruptcy exemptions. This implies that prices for medical 
malpractice policies should be lower in these jurisdictions for a given 
coverage level.73 Using data from the Medical Liability Monitor, we find 
                                                                                                                                      
haircuts). Because both Texas and Florida have such unusually generous 
bankruptcy exemptions, the results from both data sets may not generalize 
nationally. 
73 Take the standard result that a monopolistic competitor sets marginal 
revenue equal to marginal cost when maximizing profit (see Andreu Mas-Colell, 
Michael Winston, and Jerry Green, Microeconomic Theory, at 386 (1995)).  If we 
express marginal revenue in terms of the elasticity of demand, we have 







i
ii e
PMR 11  (see Alph Chiang, Fundamental Methods of Mathematical 
Economics, 3rd ed., 357 (1984)), where ie  is the elasticity for demand for good i, 
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results supporting this hypothesis. Last, to validate the model’s implication 
that doctors will choose lower coverage levels when bankruptcy 
protections are stronger, we examine data from an insolvent medical 
malpractice insurer that offered policies in many different states. The 
results from this dataset are consistent with the prediction of the model. 
In several of the specifications discussed below we also include 
controls for differences in state tort law. We use Ronen Avraham’s 
Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 4th) which is a 
comprehensive reference of changes in state tort law from 1980 to  the  
present.74  The  DSTLR 4th edition contains information about state caps on 
punitive damages, caps on total damages, and caps on non-economic 
damages if those caps apply to medical malpractice cases. We also include 
information on which states limited joint and several liability and a control 
for those states that enacted periodic payment statutes forcing plaintiffs to 
receive certain settlements intermittently rather than as a lump sum. We 
include controls for states that have changed the standard necessary to 
receive punitive damages and states that divide punitive damages between 
the plaintiff and the state. We include an indicator variable if the state has 
modified the collateral sources rule in order to prevent plaintiffs from 
collecting from both a defendant and insurance. We include an indicator 
variable if the state has capped contingent fees. Finally we include an 
indicator variable if the state has created a patients’ compensation fund to 
pay damages in support of plaintiff verdicts above a certain threshold 
amount. 
These reforms are typically enacted in clusters making it 
impossible to determine the independent effect of each reform. Since we 
are interested in the impact of homestead exemptions, which to our 
knowledge have never been part of a tort reform package, we do not 
attempt to disentangle the individual effects of the tort reform laws in the 
Avraham database. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
we can solve for the price of good i as 
i
i
i
e
MCP 11
 . Thus, for a fixed marginal 
cost, it is easy to see that a larger (in magnitude) elasticity of demand will lead to a 
lower price (since elasticities are negative). 
74 Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR 5th), UNIV. 
OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, LAW & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER NO. E555, May 2014, 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.902711. 
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VI. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DATASETS 
 
A. NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BASE 
 
The National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) includes information 
on all payments made to settle a claim or a judgment against a physician in 
the medical malpractice context. Reporting is mandatory under the Health 
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.75 Given the nationwide scope of 
this mandate, the NPDB is a comprehensive dataset. 
The database contains information on over 200,000 medical 
malpractice payments made on behalf of practitioners in all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia.76 This national dataset helps us evaluate whether 
the low payments observed in the TDI data are common in states with 
generous bankruptcy protections. We use the data between 1990 (the start 
of the database) and 2005 to avoid the national bankruptcy law change. We 
also drop the handful of trials in the sample though this does not affect our 
results. In Figure 1 we present the distribution of NPDB claims across 
states. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
75 42 U.S.C. 11101. 
76 The NPDB has several well-known limitations. See Eric Helland, Jonathan 
Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Data Watch: Tort-Uring the Data, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 207 (2005) (discussing the NPDB).  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Settlements in National Practitioners’ 
Database. 
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The summary statistics for the NPDB are given below. The data 
also contain information on the type of medical error, the doctor’s age and 
the year in which the doctor received his or her medical degree. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the NPDB 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Payment amount 213,555 351,814 
Unlimited Homestead 
Exemption (1=yes) 
0.18 0.39 
Physician age 47.99 10.48 
Graduation Year   
Pre 1940 0.00 0.06 
1940-49 0.03 0.16 
1950-59 0.11 0.31 
1960-69 0.24 0.43 
1970-79 0.31 0.46 
1980-89 0.25 0.43 
1990-99 0.05 0.22 
Post 1999 0.00 0.02 
Medical Error   
Diagnosis 0.34 0.47 
Anesthesia 0.03 0.17 
Surgery 0.28 0.45 
Medication 0.06 0.23 
IV/blood 0.00 0.06 
Obstetrics 0.08 0.26 
Treatment 0.18 0.38 
Monitoring 0.01 0.12 
Equipment 0.00 0.06 
Behavior 0.00 0.02 
State minimum policy limit 
per occurrence 
92,178 230,135 
Observations 197,695 
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The estimated model is: 
 
 
where the homestead exemption variable is an indicator taking the value of 
1 if a state has an unlimited exemption and zero otherwise. X includes the 
doctor specific controls mentioned above, state tort law controls and the 
alleged injury. The model also includes individual year dummies to 
account for any nationwide trends in settlement amounts. 
The results are presented in Table 3. We find that an unlimited 
homestead exemption is associated with lower settlement payments. We 
find that the settlement payments are $34,000 lower in the NPBD, and the 
percentage impact is about 14 percent. When estimated in logs rather than 
levels, in column 3 we find that point estimate declines slightly to a 9 
percent drop but continues to be negative and significant. 
 
Table 3: NPDB Settlement Results 
Variables Payment ln(Payment) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-33,752*** 
(6,983) 
-0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Percentage Change 
in Settlement 
Amount 
-14% -9% 
Observations 189,814 189,814 
Control variables included in regressions: Physician age, graduation 
year cohort, alleged injury, year dummies, state tort reforms 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our estimates from the NPDB confirm that Texas and the other 
states with unlimited bankruptcy exemptions exhibit systematically lower 
settlements. The magnitude of this reduction is statistically significant and 
quantitatively large. 
While the regression results presented in Table 3 above may suffer 
from omitted variable bias, it does suggest that this set of states, including 
Texas, is systematically different for some reason. The characteristic that 
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these states have an unlimited homestead exemption may be correlated 
with some other unaccounted for factor that drives settlement amounts 
down. In some sense, this alone is enough to draw into question the extent 
to which the Texas settlement and haircut results can be generalized. 
Texas, and the other states in this group, are systematically different from 
the majority of states in the U.S. 
It is not generally possible to guarantee that the unlimited 
homestead exemption is driving this result, short of running some kind of 
randomized policy experiment where homestead exemptions are randomly 
assigned to states. Given the limited in-state variation in the exemption 
amounts within this set of states, it is not even possible to examine a so-
called natural experiment that proceeds as if the policy change is 
conditionally exogenous to other things affecting settlement amounts in the 
states. However, we can provide some confidence by examining the other 
predictions generated by our model above; namely, if the homestead 
exemption provides an additional avenue by which doctors protect their 
income, the elasticity of demand for the insurance should increase, 
lowering the equilibrium price for coverage in this set of states. Also, if the 
presence of these exemptions is driving the lower settlement amounts, we 
should observe systematically lower insurance limits in this set of states. 
 
B. MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR SURVEY 
 
Our model, given the assumption, that bankruptcy protections lead 
to lower settlements, suggests that demand for medical malpractice 
insurance should be lower in jurisdictions with large protections, which 
should lead to lower prices in those jurisdictions. To examine the impact of 
homestead exemptions on premiums, we turn to an annual survey 
conducted by Medical Liability Monitor. 
The survey began in 1991 and our data ends in 2002. The survey 
collects data on the premium for a hypothetical policy offering $1 million 
in coverage for a claim and $3 million per year. The data provides 
information at the company level for different regions within a state (i.e. 
major cities) and for three specialties: internal medicine, general surgery 
and obstetrics- gynecology. Thus the unit of observation for our analysis is 
the state- region-company-year for each of the three specialties. For 
example the data would provide us with the premium for an OBGYN in 
Los Angeles in 1999 offered by the Doctors Company. Since medical 
professional liability is not experience rated, the premiums reflect the price 
faced by all doctors of a particular specialty that the insurer is willing to 
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insure.77 
We examine the data at the company level for two reasons. First, 
companies enter and exit the survey in various years and for various 
reasons. We cannot determine if the company exited the market completely 
or simply did not report data for some region or specialty.  Though we 
have no reason to suspect that reporting is correlated with homestead 
exemptions, to control for any composition bias that might result from 
differential reporting, we include company-region-state fixed effects. 
Second, the state-region fixed effects allow us to control for sizeable 
differences in litigation rates across different regions in states, something 
that none of our datasets allow us to control for directly. 
Because the data is at the company-region level, we have a 
different number of observations across states, with California having the 
largest number of company-regions. We provide the breakdown of the 
sample by state in Figure 2. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
77 See Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine and 
Disappearing Doctors? 28 Regulation 24 (2005) for more details on MLM data. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Policies Observed in Medical Liability 
Monitor Data 
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In Table 4 we present the summary statistics from the MLM 
survey. There is very wide variation in premiums faced by doctors, with 
the lowest being a $14 per year premium offered in 1992 to general 
surgeons in rural Tennessee, while the highest premium was offered to 
OBGYNs in 1991 in Detroit ($214,301). 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for the  
Medical Liability Monitor data (1991-2002) 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Real Annual Premium 28,978 26,020 
Unlimited Homestead 
Exemption 
0.17 0.38 
Minimum Policy Limit 
Per Occurrence 
61,304 163,905 
Observations 6,303 
 
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares and is specified as 
 
where premium is the annual premium identified in the data, unlimited 
homestead exemption retains its meaning, r are the year indicators, ߮ are 
state-region fixed effects, X includes indicators for the three specialties. 
The results are presented in Table 5. We again estimate the model 
in logs and levels. We find that premiums are on average about $3,300 
lower, for the same amount of coverage, in states with unlimited 
homestead exemptions than states without an unlimited exemption. This 
represents about a 9.7% reduction in premiums. In column three we 
estimate the model using the log of premiums and again find a reduction in  
the premiums in states with unlimited homestead exemptions. In this case 
the estimated effect is smaller, about 3.6%. 
 
Table 5: Medical Liability Monitor Premium Regressions 
Variables Premium ln(Premium) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-3,372*** 
(1,081) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
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Percentage Change in 
Premium 
-9.7% -3.6% 
Observations 6,285 6,285 
Control variables included in regressions: Area fixed effects, year 
dummies, doctor specialty dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We find that physicians in states with unlimited homestead 
exemptions systematically have lower premiums, suggesting a reduction in 
demand for insurance by doctors in those states. 
 
C. INSOLVENT INSURER 
 
To further investigate the validity of our theoretical claims, the last 
dataset we use includes all closed claims from a large medical malpractice 
insurer that provided policies throughout much of the United States until it went 
insolvent in the mid-2000s. These data include information on the payments 
made, the (per occurrence and annual aggregate) policy limits, the physician 
specialty, and details about the injury. We provide summary statistics in Table 6 
That insolvent insurer’s data has several advantages over publicly 
available medical malpractice data such as the TDI data, as well as the 
comparable datasets for Florida. For our purposes, the most important is 
that the insurer has claim data from multiple states, including several 
without homestead exemptions. Unlike the National Practitioner Database 
(NPDB), the insolvent insurer’s data also contains information on claims 
that were closed without payment (either because they were unilaterally 
dropped by the plaintiff or there was a defense verdict at trial), as well as 
information on policy limits. The insolvent insurer data also contains 
information on the specialty of the doctor involved and the type of injury. 
 
Table 6: Insolvent Medical Malpractice Insurer Data Summary 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Settlement Amount 45,701 174,760 
Aggregate Policy 
Limit 
2,274,695 2,147,062 
Per Occurrence 
Policy Limit 
548,477 485,886 
Observations 38,324 
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While the insurer sold policies throughout much of the country, its 
policies were not evenly distributed across states. Figure 3 provides the 
distribution of policies by state observed in this dataset. For our purposes, 
the value of this data is somewhat limited in that the only states with 
unlimited bankruptcy exemptions for which we observe any settlements are 
Texas and Florida, with the latter providing relatively few observations. At 
a minimum, these data can show if Texas and Florida are systematically 
different from the rest of the states in the dataset in terms of insuring 
practices and settlement behavior. Some of this heterogeneity is likely 
associated with the bankruptcy provisions in those states given our NPDB 
results; however, confidence in this claim is necessarily limited given the 
data availability. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Policies Observed in Insolvent Medical 
Malpractice Insurer Data 
 
 
 
We begin by estimating the impact of unlimited homestead 
exemptions on the total policy limit78 chosen by doctors using the following 
                                                                                                                                      
78 The results are qualitatively similar if we instead use the per 
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specification, 
 
where policy limit is the per occurrence policy limit in 2005 dollars, 
unlimited homestead exemption equals one if the state in question has an 
unlimited homestead exemption, r are year indicator variables, X is the set 
of control variables include state tort laws and indicator variables for the 
different specialty of the doctor involved in the lawsuit. 
The results are presented in Table 7. The model is estimated in 
both levels and logs. The results indicate that the physicians sued in states 
with an unlimited homestead exemption have a 65% lower policy limit 
than those sued in states without the unlimited homestead exemption. 
There are two possible effects that could be driving this result. First, 
physicians may be systematically choosing lower policy limits in the states 
in which they can protect their assets from a judgment. Second, the 
selection of cases may be different in states with unlimited exemptions. 
This second effect would tend to bias the result toward zero, however, as 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would be more likely to pursue cases in which the 
doctor had, for whatever reason, selected a higher policy limit. Thus, this 
possible selection effect likely makes our conclusion about the impact of 
bankruptcy exemptions even stronger. 
 
Table 7: Policy Limit Regressions Insolvent Insurer Data 
Variables Policy Limit ln(Policy Limit) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-1,781,226*** 
(142,506) 
-1.19*** 
(0.04) 
Percentage Change in 
Policy Limit 
65.3% -70% 
Observations 36,441 36,441 
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, state tort 
reforms, physician specialty dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                                                                                                      
occurrence policy limit as the dependent variable. 
2016 EVERYTHING’S BIGGER IN TEXAS 33 
 
In Table 8 we estimate the impact of unlimited homestead 
exemptions on settlements using a Tobit regression. A Tobit regression 
corrects for situations in which the dependent variable is truncated in some 
way.79 This is important in our insolvent insurer data because there are 327 
cases (about .08%) in which the payment exceeds the policy limit. For 
some of those cases, the excess amount paid, if any, is not identified. It is 
unclear why the excess is reported in some cases but not in others, so we 
err on the side of caution and treat the observations as truncated at the 
policy limit if the excess is not reported. The results are robust to excluding 
the missing observations and estimating the model using ordinary least 
squares. The model is specified as, 
where settlement amount is the payment by the insurer, unlimited 
homestead exemption retains its meaning from above, r are year indicator 
variables, X includes controls for specialty, the severity of the injury as 
determined by the insurer (classified as minor, major, death emotional 
injuries, or no injury), and whether the injured party is a child. 
The results are presented in Table 8. In column two we estimate 
the model with all of the available cases prior to 2005 and find that the 
presence of an unlimited homestead exemption reduces settlement amounts 
by over $19,000. As would be expected, the results are larger when we 
confine ourselves to those cases which settle for a positive value rather 
than being closed without payment.80 The impact rises to $70,000 per case, 
which represents a 26% drop in payment amounts as compared to 
settlements in states without an unlimited homestead exemption. By 
contrast when the model is estimated including the $0 payment cases, we 
find a 44% reduction in payments suggesting a significant number of cases 
are dropped in the face of an unlimited homestead exemption. In column 3 
we estimate the model using the log of the settlement amount which also 
                                                                                                                                      
79 See the entry on Tobit Regressions, StataCorp. 2009. Stata 11 Base 
Reference Manual. College Station, TX: Stata Press and Wooldridge, J. M. 2009. 
Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. 4th ed. Cincinnati, OH: South-
Western. 
80 One reason for estimating the model using only the cases closed with a 
positive payment is to allow for better comparison of the results using the insolvent 
insurer data with results using the Texas and NPDB data, because both of those 
datasets do not include cases closed with zero payment. 
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eliminates   the cases settling for no payment. We find that the homestead 
exemption is associated with about a 20% decline in payments to plaintiffs. 
 
Table 8: Settlement Amounts Insolvent Insurer Data 
Variables Settlement 
Amount 
Settlement 
Amount > 0 
ln(Settlement 
Amount) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-19,983*** 
(4,143) 
-70,882*** 
(20,911) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
Percentage 
Change in 
Settlement 
Amount 
-44% -26% -19% 
Observations 36,442 6,402 6,402 
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, physician 
specialty dummies, injury severity dummies, dummy for whether 
victim was child 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
The results from our insolvent insurer data indicate that doctors in 
states with an unlimited homestead exemption systematically pay out less 
in settlements and select lower policy limits. This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that doctors in these states have greater bargaining power in 
settlement negotiations and, hence, decide to insure less, because their 
assets are at less risk.   Note that these settlement reductions line up    
nicely with the proportional size of the haircuts identified in the TDI data, 
supporting our concern about the generalizability of the findings from the 
Texas research. While the results are consistent with the bankruptcy 
exemption hypothesis, they could also be driven by other peculiar aspects 
of Texas and Florida. 
Thus, again, at a minimum, our results suggest that Texas and 
Florida are peculiar relative to the other states covered in the dataset. This 
draws into question any attempt to extrapolate from these states to predict 
what occurs in other markets with respect to medical malpractice insurance 
policies and settlements. Further, the results are at least consistent with our 
hypothesis that the existence of an unlimited homestead exemption is 
important in understanding the dynamics of the Texas insurance market 
and the settlement environment in that jurisdiction. 
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VII. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND CAVEATS 
 
In this section we explore two robustness checks on our results. 
The first is to include state minimum policy requirements in the regression. 
During the sample period several states required doctors to have a specified 
minimum insurance policy. Clearly this will affect the policy limits chosen 
by the doctor and may impact settlement negotiations. The concern that led 
us to first analyze the data without considering these minimum insurance 
requirements is that plaintiffs’ attorneys may lobby to have minimum 
policy limits in those states with unlimited homestead exemptions, thus 
leading to an endogenously-driven correlation between the requirements 
and the unlimited exemption. We have no anecdotal evidence of this, and 
states with unlimited homestead exemptions do not appear to be 
systematically overrepresented among the states with minimum policy 
requirements. Nevertheless, we treat the results including the minimum 
requirements as a robustness check, rather than including the limits in our 
primary specifications. 
 
A. MINIMUM COVERAGE REGULATIONS 
 
Between 1988 and 2008 13 states had some sort of minimum 
liability coverage for doctors. The limits are summarized in Table 9. The 
amounts are typically small relative to the policy limits found in the 
insolvent insurer data; although one state, Pennsylvania, does require one 
million dollars of per incident coverage. 
 
Table 9: Summary of State Rules Covering Minimum Liability 
Insurance 
State Rule Years 
AK none 1988-2008 
AL none 1988-2009 
AR none 1988-2010 
AZ none 1988-2011 
CA none 1988-2012 
CO none 1988-2013 
CT none 1988-1994 
CT $500,000 1995-2008 
DE none 1988-2008 
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FL $100,000 1988-2008 
GA none 1988-2008 
HI none 1988-2008 
IA none 1988-2008 
ID none 1988-2008 
IL none 1988-2008 
IN $250,000 1988-2008 
KS none 1988-2008 
KY none 1988-2008 
LA none 1988-2008 
MA $100,000 1988-2008 
MD none 1988-2008 
ME none 1988-2008 
MI none 1988-2008 
MN none 1988-2008 
MO $500,000 1988-2008 
MS none 1988-2008 
MT none 1988-2008 
NC none 1988-2008 
ND none 1988-2008 
NE none 1988-2008 
NH none 1988-2008 
NJ none 1988-1994, 1998-2001 
NJ $1,000,000 1995-1997,  2002-2008 
NM none 1988-2008 
NV none 1988-2008 
NY none 1988-2008 
OH none 1988-2008 
OK none 1988-2008 
OR none 1988-2008 
PA none 1988-2008 
PA $100,000 1988-1996 
PA $300,000 1997-1998 
PA $400,000 1999-2000 
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PA $500,000 2001-2002 
PA $1,000,000 2003-2008 
RI none 1988-2008 
SC $100,000 1988-2008 
SD none 1988-2008 
TN none 1988-2008 
TX none 1988-2008 
UT none 1988-2008 
VA none 1988-2008 
VT none 1988-2008 
WA none 1988-2008 
WI none 1988-2008 
WV none 1988-2008 
WY $50,000 1988-2008 
 
For each of the regressions presented in section 6 above, we now 
include the minimum policy limit (which is either zero for states without 
the limit or the limit itself) for the relevant years. 
In Table 10 we estimate the NPDB regressions including minimum 
policy requirements. 
 
Table 10: NPDB Settlement Regressions with Minimum Policy 
Limits 
Variables Payment ln(Payment) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-22,312*** 
(8,181) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Minimum Policy 
Limit Per Occurrence 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.000*** 
(0.00) 
Percentage Change in 
Settlement Amount 
-10% -2% 
Observations 189,814 189,814 
Control variables included in regressions: Physician age, graduation 
year cohort, alleged injury, year dummies, state tort reforms 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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While the magnitudes of our homestead exemption effects decline 
somewhat, they are still negative and the results in the regressions using 
the level of the settlement is still statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. The minimum policy limit amounts are positively correlated with 
settlement amounts. Despite the decline in coefficient magnitude, these 
results are generally consistent with those presented above. 
In table 11 we estimate our premium regressions using the MLM 
data, taking into account the minimum policy requirements. We again find 
that states with unlimited homestead exemptions have lower annual 
premiums. The impact is very similar to the results obtained when we do 
not include the minimum policy requirements. 
 
Table 11: Medical Liability Monitor Premium Regressions with 
Minimum Policy Limits 
Variables Premium ln(Premium) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-3,377*** 
(1,082) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
Minimum Policy 
Limit Per Occurrence 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Percentage Change in 
Premium 
-10% -3.6% 
Observations 6,285 6,285 
Control variables included in regressions: Area fixed effects, year 
dummies, doctor specialty dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of our policy limit specification using the insolvent 
insurer are presented in Table 12. Even when we include controls for 
minimum policy requirements, which do cause a statistically significant 
increase in the level of coverage chosen by doctors, we still find that 
unlimited homestead exemptions reduce the amount of coverage selected 
by doctors. Moreover this effect is quite large, with doctors in states with 
unlimited homestead exemption states selecting 61% less coverage than in 
states in which less asset protection is available. These results are virtually 
identical to those discussed above. 
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Table 12: Policy Limit Regression with Minimum Coverage 
Control 
Variables Policy Limit ln(Policy Limit) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-1,666,266*** 
(149,933) 
-1.11*** 
(0.04) 
Minimum Policy 
Limit 
0.22** 
(0.09) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Percentage Change 
in Policy Limit 
-61.1% -67% 
Observations 36,441 36,441 
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, state tort 
reforms, physician specialty dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Table 13 we estimate the settlement amount specifications using 
the insolvent insurer data. As predicted, minimum policy requirements 
increase the amount of settlement in all specifications. We continue to find 
that unlimited homestead exemptions reduce the amount of settlement 
when we include zero payment cases. When we drop cases with zero 
payments from the data, the impact of unlimited exemptions is negative but 
not significant. Finally when we use the log of settlement amounts the 
coefficient on unlimited homestead exemptions is not significant and flips 
sign. As explained below the instability of these results may be the result of 
the reduction in sample size when the zero payment cases are excluded. 
 
Table 13: Settlement Amounts Insurer Database with Minimum 
Policy Limit 
Variables Settlement 
Amount 
Settlement 
Amount>0 
Ln(settlement 
Amount) 
Unlimited Homestead 
Exemption 
-10,649** 
(4,939) 
-27,324 
(24,652) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
Minimum Policy 
Limit Per Occurrence 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.06*** 
(0.017) 
0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Percentage Change in 
Settlement Amount 
-21% -10% 7.7% 
Observations 36,442 6,402 6,402 
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Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, physician 
specialty dummies, injury severity dummies, dummy for whether 
victim was child 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of this robustness check are not as comforting. While 
we continue to find a negative effect of unlimited homestead exemptions 
on settlement amounts in the level regressions, the log specification 
generates a coefficient that is essentially zero. Further, even in the level 
specifications, the magnitude of the coefficients declines substantially. 
The results of our first robustness check indicate that, while 
minimum policy limits do increase coverage amounts and settlement 
payments, the impact of unlimited homestead exemptions retains its 
significance in most specifications. We now turn to a second inquiry: Do 
partial homestead exemptions generate similar, though smaller in 
magnitude, effects? 
 
B. IMPACT OF PARTIAL HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS 
 
In this section we examine the impact of partial homestead 
exemptions that allow some sheltering of assets. The classification is far 
less clear cut that the unlimited homestead exemption, because unlimited 
states have very few restrictions on the nature and the amount of home 
equity that can be protected. By contrast, states with partial exemptions 
often have specific qualifications. For example, Connecticut allows the 
exemption only for certain hospital debts and Maine requires dependents to 
qualify. We have no systematic way to capture these specific 
qualifications, and so we treat the partial homestead exemption as a 
dummy variable, recognizing that it will be estimated with more noise than 
our unlimited homestead exception variable. 
We estimate the NPBD regressions including indicator variables 
for both unlimited and partial homestead exemptions. The results are 
presented in Table 14. Consistent with our original findings, we estimate 
that both kinds of exemptions are associated with lower settlements, 
whether the payment is estimated in levels or logs. Interestingly, the effect 
of partial exemptions is smaller than the effect of unlimited exemptions, at 
least in the level specification, and this difference is statistically significant. 
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Table 14: Settlement Amount Regressions NPDB with Both 
Unlimited and Partial Homestead Exemption Controls 
Variables Payment ln(Payment) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-46,803*** 
(7,417) 
-0.24*** 
(0.03) 
Partial Homestead 
Exemption  
-21,650*** 
(7,017) 
-0.25*** 
(0.03) 
Percentage Change in 
Settlement Amount 
-19% -22% 
Observations 189,814 189,814 
Control variables included in regressions: Physician age, graduation 
year cohort, alleged injury, year dummies, state tort reforms 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We find similar effects in the Medical Liability Monitor regressions, 
with the unlimited homestead exemption generating a negative effect that is 
larger in magnitude than the effect associated with a partial homestead 
exemption at least in the level specifications. Given that a  partial exemption 
has much less utility as an asset protection mechanism, this is what our model 
predicts. The coefficients in the log specifications are essentially equal. The 
results are generally not very precise though, so while the point estimates are 
largely consistent with theory, we cannot conclude with confidence that the 
results could not be the result of random associations in the data. 
 
Table 15: Medical Liability Monitor Premium Regressions with 
Both Unlimited and Partial Homestead Exemption Controls 
Variables Premium ln(Premium) 
Unlimited Homestead 
Exemption 
-3,378 
(3,216) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
Partial Homestead 
Exemption  
-6.00 
(2,987) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
Percentage Change in 
Premium 
-10% -0% 
Observations 6,285 6,285 
Control variables included in regressions: Area fixed effects, year 
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dummies, doctor specialty dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of our policy limit regressions are shown in Table 16. 
Using the insolvent insurer data, we find similar impacts from the 
unlimited exemptions, but we find positive and significant impacts of 
partial exemptions on policy limits. This is surprising since the omitted 
category is no limit. Thus, the results suggest that the highest policy limits 
chosen are chosen in states with partial homestead exemptions. 
 
Table 16: Policy Limit Regressions with Both Unlimited and 
Limited Homestead Exemption Controls 
Variables Policy Limit ln(Policy Limit) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-1,715,926*** 
(143,053) 
-1.18*** 
(0.04) 
Partial Homestead 
Exemption  
678,991*** 
(135,485) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
Percentage Change in 
Limit 
-75% -60% 
Observations 36,441 36,441 
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, state tort 
reforms, physician specialty dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of our settlement regressions are shown in Table 17. 
The first column reports the results using all of the cases in the insolvent 
insurer data. The second column reports the results when we eliminate the 
zero payment cases. The third column reports the results using the log of 
the settlement amount. In all three specifications both the unlimited and the 
partial exemptions are associated with lower settlement amounts than states 
without any exemption, although the impact of the partial exemptions is 
not significant when we eliminate the zero payment cases. These results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that defendants are advantaged in settlement 
negotiations when they have the ability to shield assets from a judgment. 
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Table 17: Settlement Amount Regressions with Both Unlimited 
and Partial Homestead Exemption Controls 
Variables Settlement 
Amount 
Settlement 
Amount>0 
Ln(settlement 
Amount) 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-22,671*** 
(4,178) 
-72,921*** 
(21,038) 
-0.26*** 
(0.08) 
Partial Homestead 
Exemption  
-21,392*** 
(4,347) 
-18,068 
(20,627) 
-0.40*** 
(0.08) 
Percentage Change 
in Settlement 
-45% -27% -23% 
Observations 36,442 6,402 6,402 
Control variables included in regressions: Year dummies, physician 
specialty dummies, injury severity dummies, dummy for whether 
victim was child 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Although somewhat less precise, our estimates including both 
unlimited and partial homestead exemptions are consistent with the general 
hypothesis that the ability to shield assets increases defendant doctors 
bargaining power in settlement negotiation and thus leads doctors to 
choose lower policy limits, at least in unlimited exemption states. 
Clearly, the weakest of our empirical results are those estimated 
using the insolvent insurer dataset. The limited variation in the unlimited 
homestead exemption is a concern, as is the relatively large effects we find. 
Establishing the link between homestead exemptions and policy limits, 
however, is crucial to validating our theoretical hypothesis. There is only 
one other dataset, of which we are aware, that includes policy limit 
information: the 1988 Physicians Practice Costs and Income Survey (1988 
PPCIS). 
The PPCIS is a cross-sectional survey of physicians conducted for 
the Health Care Financing Administration.  The survey includes responses 
from 3.505 physicians (a 61% response rate) drawn from a stratified 
random sample of physicians from the American Medical Association's 
1988Physician Master File. The survey was conducted between July 1989 
and March 1990.  In addition to its broader sample, a benefit of this dataset 
is that it is not conditioned on physicians who have been sued. Instead, it is 
a sample of all physicians. 
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For our purposes the key questions concern the physician’s per 
occurrence policy limit, the total limit on all events in a year, the premium 
paid by the physician, and whether the physician had dropped his or her 
insurance (i.e., whether she has “gone bare”). Table 18 provides summary 
statistics for the PPCIS. 
 
Table 18:  PPCIS Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Per Occurrence Limit 1,060,940 1,109,691 
Total Limit 2,638,857 2,298,499 
Premium 17,839 28,074 
No Coverage 0.01 0.07 
 
If we regress each of these outcomes on our unlimited bankruptcy 
homestead exemption indicator, we get the results contained in Table 19. 
 
Table 19:  PPCIS Regression Results 
Variable Occurrence 
Policy 
Limit 
Total Policy 
Limit 
Premium No 
Coverage 
Unlimited 
Homestead 
Exemption 
-109,075** 
(42,982) 
-
465,826*** 
(81,841) 
1,396 
(1,457) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
Percentage 
Change in 
Outcome 
-10% -18% 8% 130% 
Observations 3,335 3,231 3,400 3,489 
Control Variables Include: Physician age, sex dummies, and 
specialty dummies 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
This set of results supports our earlier results on the effects of 
unlimited homestead exemptions on policy limits, and provides a new 
result that is consistent with the theoretical idea, namely, physicians are 
more willing to go without medical malpractice insurance when they have 
the protection of unlimited homestead exemptions. In this dataset, 
however, we do not find a price effect consistent with our theory. 
Specifically, we find no statistically significant relationship between the 
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existence of an unlimited homestead exemption and the price paid for 
insurance.  On net, the results on policy specific outcomes in the insolvent 
insurer dataset and in the PPCIS data are largely consistent with our theory 
but some inconsistencies and problems with each dataset provide some 
room for skepticism. The results on premiums from the Medical Liability 
Monitor improve confidence somewhat, but more research on this 
phenomenon is clearly needed. 
These results on settlements are in line with those found in the 
Texas dataset. This suggests that the large size of the haircuts identified in 
that dataset may result from Texas’s unlimited homestead exemption. At a 
minimum, these results suggest caution is necessary when generalizing 
from the results found in the TDI data about the medical malpractice 
insurance market and settlement dynamics in medical malpractice cases. 
Although our results are broadly consistent with the substitution 
theory we put forth above, causal inference in this context is limited given 
the limited within jurisdiction variation we observe in bankruptcy 
exemptions. It is possible that the true driving variables in these 
relationships are merely correlated with the bankruptcy exemptions, but 
these exemptions themselves do not cause the behavior we observe. While 
we have advanced a plausible theory consistent with these findings, other 
as yet unarticulated hypotheses may be even more plausible. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
It is a puzzle as to why plaintiffs do not go after defendants’ 
personal assets beyond insurance limits. While for a typical personal injury 
case, it may be plausible to assume that defendants have few assets, 
medical malpractice cases are different, given the affluence of physicians. 
However, the Texas closed claims research suggests that plaintiffs settle 
for policy limits in those cases too. If that is true, in equilibrium, we should 
find physicians reducing the amount of insurance that they buy.  The 
degree to which this is a viable strategy, however, is limited by the 
possibility that plaintiffs will pursue personal assets if limits are too low. 
While it has been suggested that the determination of adequate 
insurance coverage is a question of fairness or morality, an alternate 
explanation is that plaintiffs are simply being pragmatic. When it is 
difficult to get at assets, the plaintiffs settle for the insurance policy limits, 
leading physicians to purchase lower limits in the future. Instead, when it is 
more difficult to protect assets, plaintiffs are more willing to go after those 
assets, leading physicians to purchase more insurance coverage. 
Using variation in state homestead exemptions in bankruptcy, we 
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test this hypothesis and find support for it in three separate datasets. In 
addition to adding some insight into the blood money phenomenon, these 
results suggest that earlier research focusing on haircuts in Texas medical 
malpractice cases may not be representative. That is, it is plausible that the 
large haircuts and low insurance limits found in that work are the result of 
Texas homestead protection laws, which are qualitatively different than 
those in most other states. At a minimum, our results suggest that there is 
something different about Texas when it comes to medical malpractice 
insurance practices and settlement dynamics. This implies that any 
extrapolation from work using the TDI data to general conclusions about 
medical malpractice is problematic. This highlights the importance of using 
multi-jurisdictional datasets when doing empirical work on medical 
malpractice. 
